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The effect of intra-firm pay dispersion on work performance is controversial and the empirical 
evidence is mixed. High pay dispersion may act as an extra incentive for employees’ effort or 
it  may  reduce  motivation  and  team  cohesiveness.  These  effects  can  also  coexist  and  the 
prevalence of one effect over the other may depend on the use of different definitions of what 
constitutes a “team.” For this paper we collected a unique dataset from the men’s major 
soccer league in Italy. For each match we computed the exact pay dispersion of each work 
team and estimated its effect on team performance. Our results show that when the work team 
is considered to consist of only the players who contribute to the result, high pay dispersion 
has a detrimental impact on team performance. Several robustness checks confirm this result. 
In addition, we show that enlarging the definition of work team causes this effect to disappear 
or even become positive. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay dispersion is due 
to worst individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation. 
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Does pay dispersion have a positive or negative effect on work performance? The literature 
does not provide a clear answer. On the one hand, pay dispersion can have a negative impact 
on team performance because it may undermine all the benefits of team cooperation (Milgrom 
and  Roberts  1988;  Akerlof  and  Yellen  1990;  Lazear  1989).  Because  employees  may 
experience feelings of relative deprivation if wages are unequal (Martin 1981), employers 
have to use narrow wage differentials to reduce dissonance among employees and favor team 
cohesiveness (Levine 1991). On the other hand, larger intra-firm pay dispersion can motivate 
employees  around  the  bottom  of  the  pay  distribution  scale  to  work  harder  for  the  future 
reward of a higher salary (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  Pay dispersion may also be beneficial for 
attracting and keeping talent (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) or for avoiding the loss of workers 
who are crucial to the firm’s output (Ramaswamy and Rowthorn 1991). 
The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed and therefore inconclusive. Some studies 
support the idea that pay dispersion has a beneficial effect on team performance (Becker and 
Huselid 1992; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990; Marchand, Smeeding, and Torrey, 2006); other 
studies  show  that  pay  dispersion  has  a  detrimental  effect  (Bloom  1999;  Depken  2000; 
Wiseman and Chatterjee 2003; Jane 2010); further studies find no significant effect (Berri and 
Jewell 2004; Avrutin and Sommers 2007; Katayama and Nuch 2011). Our interpretation of 
these contradictory results is that these two effects coexist and that the prevalence of one 
effect over the other depends on the definition of team used. 
In this paper we show that the estimates of the effect of pay dispersion vary when using 
different definitions of what constitutes a team. We think this is important because conflicting 
evidence does not help managers decide how to use pay dispersion optimally. Pfeffer and 
Langton (1993, 383) wrote that “one of the more useful avenues for research on pay systems 
may be precisely this task of determining not which pay scheme is best but, rather, under what 
conditions salary dispersion has positive effects and under what conditions it has negative 
effects.”  We  provide  evidence  that  the  effect  of  pay  dispersion  can  be  positive,  null,  or 
negative depending on the precision of the definition of team. Our dataset in fact allows us to 
measure pay dispersion by distinguishing between “active” and “passive” players: both are 
part of the team, but only the former ones contribute to the team’s performance. 
Our  dataset  is  drawn  from  two  seasons  of  the  men’s  major  soccer  league  in  Italy. 
Professional sports data represent a unique source of data for labor market research, and they 
are widely used because they provide detailed statistics about team performance, as well as 3 
the individual athletes’ performances and salaries. Soccer is a particularly appropriate area of 
study  for  our  research  question  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  it  is  a  team  sport  where 
cooperation is crucial, although teams may also win (lose) because of extraordinarily good 
(bad) individual performance. Second, it is possible to identify each individual’s participation 
(in  terms  of  minutes  played)  and  to  obtain  repeated  measures  of  performance  over  time 
(multiple matches in one season). Third, these data are reliable, detailed, and reported with 
high precision. Our dataset contains information on the net salary of each team member, and 
statistics on each team, each team member, each head coach, and each match. Fourth, this 
sport is one of the most well known and popular in the world, particularly in Italy, where it 
generates revenues of about 1.5 billion euros (Deloitte 2011). Given this popularity, players’ 
salaries are highly publicized in the media. This means that each player is aware of the pay of 
his teammates, at least until the opening of a new session of the players’ transfer market (each 
January).  
Another reason why we decided to use soccer data is that each team roster usually consists 
of around 25 to 30 athletes, but only 11 to 14 of them actually play a single match. Therefore, 
these data allow us to measure the effect of pay dispersion using various definitions of team 
and provide an explanation for why the previous literature has found mixed evidence. The 
existing literature cited above (for a recent review, see Kahn 2000) looks at end-of-season 
data, comparing the wins-to-matches ratio with the pay dispersion of the entire team roster, 
paying  no  attention  to  individual  contributions  to  team  performance.  To  the  best  of  our 
knowledge, our study is the first to compare the outcome of a single task (a match) with the 
pay  dispersion  of  only  those  who  contributed  to  the  task.  We  believe  this  improves  the 
precision of the comparison and can shed new light on our understanding on the effect of pay 
dispersion on work performance. 
Our findings are clear-cut. Using the narrowest definition of a team, that is, considering 
only those who played the match and how long they played for, pay dispersion has an overall 
negative  impact  on  team  performance;  this  result  is  consistent  with  different  robustness 
checks. However, that effect changes—and it may even become significantly positive—when 
we enlarge the definition of team to include the entire team roster. We interpret this result as 
the consequence of taking an approximation of the correct pay dispersion where a less precise 
definition can bias the estimates. 
Two  different  scenarios  may  explain  the  negative  effect  of  pay  dispersion  on  team 
performance: high pay dispersion can affect team performance through lack of cooperation 
among team members or through lack of individual effort. To understand which explanation 4 
is supported by data, we collected all (subjective) individual performance assessments for 
each match, for each team, and for each player reported by the three most popular Italian 
sports newspapers. Our results show that higher pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on 
individual performances, but has no significant effect on cooperation. 
Finally, we want to point out that our analysis controls for pay size and we use indicators 
of pay dispersion that are dimensionless. For this reason, our results can be extended to other 
work contexts. This is crucial because one could object that we are considering a peculiar 
work  environment,  where  workers  usually  earn  much  more  than  a  typical  worker.  Our 
findings may be able to help employers determine which type of pay distribution will be more 
effective within a firm and make the right decisions about which employees to hire. This is 
not  a  trivial  decision:  should  a  firm  hire  one  expensive  superstar  and  two  inexpensive 
employees, or three medium-priced players? This paper provides some numerical examples 
showing that managers should carefully take into account the hidden cost of hiring a superstar 
and its effect on team performance, while keeping constant the overall team quality. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes our data, 
discusses the methodology and reports some summary statistics on the key variables in our 
dataset. Section 3 shows our main results regarding team and individual performance. Finally, 
Section 4 presents conclusions. Two appendices provide more details on the data construction 
and further robustness checks. 
 
 
2. Data and Estimation Methodology 
In this section we discuss the environment and the variables we used in the analysis. Section 
2.1 presents the environment and our dataset, Section 2.2 illustrates the estimation method 
and lists our variables, and Section 2.3 summarizes the statistics from the dataset. 
 
2.1. Environment and Data 
Our data cover the two seasons 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 of the men’s major soccer league 
in Italy (“Serie A”). Every season 20 teams participate in the league, and each team plays 
against each other team twice (one time at the home stadium and one time away) for a total of 
38 matches. After a match three points are assigned for a win, one point for a draw, and no 
points for a defeat. The ultimate goal of each team is to earn points and be classified as high 
as possible in the league’s ranking in order to win it or at least be in the top six positions and 5 
in this way gain access to the European cups. Teams also want to avoid being placed in any of 
the bottom three positions, which would relegate them to the second division. In fact, at the 
end of each season, the three teams ranked last are replaced by the three teams ranked first in 
the second division. 
Our dataset contains information on the outcome of each match (win, draw, or defeat), on 
who played every single match and for how many minutes, and his annual net pay, as well as 
other statistics on each player, on each team, on each head coach, and on each match. We 
collected  this  unique  dataset  by  merging  data  from  the  three  most  popular  Italian  sports 
newspapers (La Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere dello Sport, and Tutto Sport), and (for players’ 
statistics) from the website www.tuttocalciatori.net. 
In any season, each team consists of about 25 to 30 athletes (hereafter, the team roster) 
specializing in different roles (goalkeeper, defender, midfielder, forward). However, only 18 
members are summoned for each match: 11 (starter players) start the game and the other 7 
(substitutes)  sit  on  the  bench  and  can  enter  the  match  at  any  time  after  the  beginning, 
replacing one of the starter players (who can no longer take further part in the match). During 
a  match  a  maximum  of  three  substitutions  is  allowed.  Common  reasons  for  substitutions 
include injury, tiredness, ineffectiveness, or a tactical switch.  In the 2009–2010 season 462 
players and in the 2010–2011 season 463 players played for at least one minute during our 
observation period. In most cases those who played in one season also played in the other 
one; however, from our perspective they are completely different players because they may 
earn different salaries in the two seasons. For this reason and for sake of simplicity and with a 
little abuse of terminology, we say that 925 team members have played overall. A similar 
argument can be made for teams: because those teams present in both seasons may have very 
different  lists  of  team  members,  we  treat  them  as  different,  and  we  say  that  our  sample 
includes 40 teams. We know the salaries of only 874 of the 925 players (94.49%), while we 
impute the pay of the remaining 51 ones as specified in the Appendix, Section A.1. This 
imputation has a negligible impact on our statistics, because players for whom we needed to 
impute salaries have a marginal role in the team (on average they have played about 1% of the 
available time). 
Our dataset includes the matches played between August 23, 2009, and December 20, 2009 
(2009–2010 season), and between August 29, 2010, and December 19, 2010 (2010–2011 
season), for a total of 666 observations.
1 To be conservative and have a clean dataset, we 
                                                 
1 We observed 20 teams in season 2009–2010 and 20 teams in season 2010–2011 over a sequence of 17 matches 
for each team. In total we have 666 observations, 14 less than the expected 680 (= 40 × 17) because some 6 
decided to use only the matches played before the opening of the January players’ transfer 
market,  during  which  every  team  is  allowed  to  trade  players  with  other  teams.  We  then 
ignored  the  remaining  matches,  for  which  we  cannot  be  sure  about  the  exact  salaries  of 
players  transferred,  especially  the  ones  coming  from  foreign  leagues.  On  average  these 
players  account  for  around  12%  of  the  team  members  after  the  January  market  (see  the 
Appendix, Section A.2), and they usually take a relevant role in the team—playing most of 
the remaining matches. If we included these data, any guesses about the missing salaries 
would likely bias our estimates. However, there is relatively high correlation (0.589) between 
the number of points earned in the first 17 matches and the number of points earned in the 
remaining matches. 
 
2.2. Variables and Estimation Method 
Our unit of analysis is the team playing a match in a given season; in total we then have 40 
teams, 20 for each season. Recall that the team may win, draw, or lose a match, earning 
respectively three, one, or no points. Our dependent variable, measuring team performance, is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the team wins the match (which happens in 37.24% of the cases); it is 
equal to 0 if the team draws or loses the match. We group draws and defeats together because 
the  ultimate  goal  for  a  team  is  to  win  a  match.  In  a  robustness  check,  reported  in  the 
Appendix, Section B.1, we repeat the analysis treating first both wins and draws as a positive 
outcome, and then each outcome separately. Our main results were confirmed. 
We perform a probit regression with panel-robust standard errors (clustered for each team 
in each season); this way we allow for possible correlation across observations referring to 
different  matches  of  the  same  team.  We  opted  for  this  model  because  our  data  show  no 
evidence of team-specific panel effects (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.1); use of  
this model allows us to obtain more efficient estimates. 
Our purpose is to obtain measures of pay dispersion, as well as other indicators, that are 
specific for each match of each team. For this purpose, the term active team members (ATMs) 
for a team in a given match refers to all team members who actually played at least one 
minute of the match. For such a match we then neglect all of the remaining members who did 
not contribute to the result of the match. As a consequence, the set of active team members for 
a team varies match by match.
2 
                                                                                                                                                      
matches were postponed to after the January transfer market due to bad weather conditions or schedule conflicts 
with international competitions.  
2 Consider that, in our data, on average 8.44 out of the 11 starter players also began the previous match. In 
addition, some number between 6 and 14 team members who played at least one minute in a match also played 7 
The benchmark specification includes different variables that for clarity we group into six 
categories: pay, team, coach, match, opponent, and time. Our focus is on the first group of pay 
variables; the remaining ones serve as control variables. In the analysis, all of the variables 
concerning team composition are based solely on the ATMs, and the contribution of each 
member is weighted by the amount of time he actually played in the match. The variables in 
the pay and team categories thus refer to the ATMs of the team, whereas the variables in the 
opponent category refer to the ATMs of the opponent team. This means that pay, team, and 
opponent statistics differ match by match and that members who had no active role in the 
match are ignored. In what follows we discuss the variables used in the analysis. 
 
Pay variables 
We consider the logarithm of the average pay, and the logarithm of a dimensionless measure 
of pay dispersion. In all the cases we refer to annual salaries in thousands of euros net of 
taxes.  Let  us  define  , ix p   as  the  pay  of  player  ,1 , , ii I = K   in  team  ,1 , , xx X = K ,  where 
[ ] ,, 0,90 ixt m ∈  represents the minutes of the match actually played
3 by the same player in 
match  ,1 , , tt T = K . We treat  ,, ixt m  as a weight to compute the average pay for team  x in 
match t: 
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As a pay dispersion measure, we take the Theil index. This indicator belongs to the class of 
entropy indexes and is frequently used to measure economic inequality. The index is defined 
as the mean of the products between individual pay relative to average pay, and its logarithm 
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The index is equal to 0 for the case of no pay dispersion (i.e., all salaries are identical); a 
higher index denotes higher pay dispersion. Notice that the indicator is dimensionless, which 
means that what matters to us is only the individual pay relative to the average pay; this 
                                                                                                                                                      
at least one minute in the previous match. The set of active team members thus varies largely from one match to 
another. 
3 We do not consider the extra time played after the regular time (90 minutes), which is at the discretion of the 
referee and depends on various stoppages (e.g., substitutions, injuries) incurred during the match. 8 
allows us to compare pay distributions across teams and matches, disregarding the average 
pay level, which varies markedly (from 213,808 euros to 4,356,061 euros). As a robustness 
check, we repeated the analysis using the popular Gini index rather than the Theil index. In 
this case our main findings were qualitatively confirmed, and quantitatively even emphasized 
(for details see the Appendix, Section B.2). 
 
Team variables 
We use weighted average values in a given match for players’ ages, the fraction of new 
players on the team, and the number of years (even if not consecutive) on the team and in the 
Italian first division; the last two variables serve to proxy players’ experience.  
 
Coach variables 
For the coach we use the same set of information as for the team, that is: coach age, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if he is in his first season with the team, and the number of years (even if 
not consecutive) on the team and in the Italian first division. Head coaches in soccer are often 
fired from one season to another, and even during the same season. We then also include in 




We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the team plays a domestic (home) match and also use 
the number of injured players and the number of disqualified players.
4 The last two variables 
are added because injuries and disqualifications may prevent a coach from using his preferred 
players  during  a  match.  However,  we  expect  disqualifications  to  have  a  stronger  effect 
because they usually involve team members who play more frequently. 
 
Opponent variables 
We consider the same variables as in the pay and team groups, but we base them on the 
ATMs of the opponent team. The purpose is to in this way capture the characteristics (in 
particular the strength) of the opposing team. An alternative would be to add as many dummy 
variables as the teams (40). Doing so, our main results would be confirmed. The shortcoming 
of such an approach, however, is the potential inefficiency of estimating many coefficients in 
a probit regression model; for this reason we prefer our benchmark specification. 
                                                 
4 Soccer players may be sanctioned with a yellow or red card for a specific misconduct. Multiple yellow cards or 
one red card produces an automatic disqualification for at least one following match. 9 
Time variables 
We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the match was played during the 2010–2011 season, 
and dummy variables for the month if the match was played from August to December. 
 
2.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 lists all variables used in the analysis and reports some summary statistics (median, 
mean,  standard  deviation,  minimum,  and  maximum).  All  statistics  are  calculated  for  the 
ATMs in the 666 observations of our sample. The purpose of using all of these variables is to 
control for the physical, social, and other characteristics of the team members, the coach, and 
the match. 
From the table we learn that, for the median observation, the ATMs’ average pay is 584 
thousand euros, the Theil index is 0.093 (ranging from 0.006 to 0.497), on average the ATMs 
are around 27 years old, they already have accumulated two years of experience in the team 
and five years in the first division, and around 26% of them are in their first year with the 
team. In addition, 57% of the coaches are new to the team, 14% of them started managing the 
team after the beginning of the season, and they have little experience with the team and the 
first division. Finally, disqualifications and especially injuries are frequent, and sometimes 
they  may  force  the  coach  to  reshape  the  starting  team  formation  (in  fact,  we  observe  a 
maximum of 4 disqualified players and 11 injured players). In our analysis we account for this 
when measuring the effect of pay dispersion. Further statistics on pay dispersion are shown in 
the Appendix, Section A.3. 
 
TABLE 1. Summary statistics (666 observations on 40 teams) 
Variable  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Pay           
Average pay (thousands of euros)  583.788  1039.801  998.699  213.808  4356.061 
Theil index  0.093  0.114  0.077  0.006  0.497 
Team           
Fraction of new players in the team  0.255  0.263  0.156  0  0.701 
Years in the team  2.202  2.341  1.039  0.483  5.985 
Years in first division  4.635  4.858  1.510  1.597  9.645 
Average age  27.465  27.488  1.327  24.298  30.889 
Coach           
New to the team  1  0.571  0.495  0  1 
Replaced during season  0  0.144  0.351  0  1 
Years in the team  0  0.685  0.982  0  4 
Years in first division  3  4.372  3.686  0  14 
Age  48  49.414  6.882  38  65 
Match           
Injured players  3  3.081  1.798  0  11 
Disqualified players  0  0.431  0.662  0  4 
Home play  0.5  0.5  0.500  0  1 
Note: For the “opponent” variables we consider the same variables as in the pay and team categories, but we 
base them on the ATM of the opposing team. We do not report summary statistics because they coincide with 
those in the pay and team categories. 10 
Table 2 lists the teams in our dataset (20 for each season) and some average statistics (age, 
experience,  fraction  of  new  players)  for  their  ATMs  in  each  match.  Teams  are  listed 
according to the ranking at the end of each season, where the first team listed is the winner of 
the championship and the last three teams are eventually relegated to the second division. 
First of all, we notice that the 17 teams enrolled in both seasons show marked differences 
over the two years. From the table we also observe wide heterogeneity across teams within 
the same season, with no clear pattern going from bottom to top teams. The last column of 
Table 2 shows the fraction of players that in our sample played at least for one minute. This 
fraction is between 0.69 and 0.96; note that it is always below 1. This indicates that some 
team  members  never  play;  usually  those  excluded  are  injured  and  homegrown  players. 
Ignoring  this,  and  treating  all  team  members  equally,  the  analysis  on  the  effect  of  pay 
dispersion may generate different results, as we will clarify in Section 3.2.  
 
   11 
TABLE 2. Team statistics 















FC Internazionale Milano  0.314  3.553  4.961  29.320  0.733 
AS Roma  0.093  3.755  6.278  28.378  0.871 
AC Milan  0.128  4.538  8.063  29.619  0.786 
UC Sampdoria  0.265  1.862  5.751  26.639  0.778 
US Città di Palermo  0.188  1.650  4.085  25.886  0.852 
SSC Napoli  0.289  1.465  4.743  26.897  0.808 
Juventus FC  0.239  3.056  5.838  28.460  0.929 
Parma FC  0.535  0.847  6.160  27.604  0.808 
Genoa CFC  0.359  1.527  4.421  27.760  0.786 
AS Bari  0.435  1.507  2.836  26.267  0.774 
ACF Fiorentina  0.110  2.695  7.519  27.818  0.750 
SS Lazio  0.042  2.582  5.689  27.455  0.806 
Catania Calcio  0.282  1.650  2.333  26.120  0.893 
Cagliari Calcio  0.134  3.406  4.695  26.910  0.720 
Udinese Calcio  0.131  2.370  4.312  25.502  0.733 
AC Chievo Verona  0.199  2.647  4.622  29.198  0.852 
Bologna FC  0.439  0.810  5.098  29.076  0.815 
Atalanta Calcio  0.253  2.513  4.024  26.915  0.923 
AS Siena  0.302  1.692  4.203  26.550  0.885 
AS Livorno  0.310  1.552  3.689  27.437  0.800 
AVERAGE  0.252  2.280  4.962  27.491  0.834 















AC Milan  0.228  4.749  7.927  29.480  0.828 
FC Internazionale Milano  0.108  3.786  5.430  29.308  0.862 
SSC Napoli  0.166  1.766  5.393  27.573  0.917 
Udinese Calcio  0.166  3.117  4.723  25.740  0.909 
SS Lazio  0.196  2.130  4.479  27.918  0.846 
AS Roma  0.188  4.001  7.135  29.506  0.963 
Juventus FC  0.542  2.066  5.297  27.173  0.926 
US Città di Palermo  0.308  1.555  3.299  24.939  0.692 
ACF Fiorentina  0.124  2.960  7.440  27.659  0.929 
Genoa CFC  0.499  1.550  4.310  27.718  0.846 
AC Chievo Verona  0.434  2.065  3.594  27.916  0.880 
Parma FC  0.311  1.358  5.315  27.914  0.769 
Cagliari Calcio  0.077  3.281  4.391  26.090  0.760 
Catania Calcio  0.083  2.255  2.887  27.144  0.889 
Bologna FC  0.399  0.902  3.363  26.605  0.923 
AC Cesena  0.494  1.703  4.168  28.302  0.852 
US Lecce  0.401  2.446  2.529  27.306  0.926 
UC Sampdoria  0.124  2.258  5.975  26.046  0.929 
Brescia Calcio  0.383  2.446  4.015  28.541  0.960 
AS Bari  0.236  2.322  3.679  27.012  0.929 
AVERAGE  0.274  2.401  4.755  27.484  0.873 
Note: Teams are listed according to their position at the end of the season; teams promoted from second division 
are highlighted. Averages for each team are based on the ATM of all of the matches (either 16 or 17) played by 
the team in a given season. Fraction of players employed: number of players employed at least for one minute 
over total number of players. 
 
To stress this point, Figure 1 plots for each team the fraction of wins over the Theil index, 
using two different methods. In the top panel, the pay dispersion index is based on the whole 
team roster, disregarding players’ involvement in the matches; this is the standard approach 
adopted in the literature. In the bottom panel, the index is the average over the matches, where 12 
for  each  match  pay  dispersion  is  based  on  the  ATM;  this  approach  is  closer  to  the  one 
followed in this paper. First of all, we notice that the index calculated in the top panel uses 
values that are on a higher scale than those of the index in the bottom panel; the reason is that 
this measure is inflated by the low pay of those members (usually the homegrown ones) who, 
although formal members of the team, do not contribute to the team’s performance. 
 
FIGURE 1. Team performance and pay dispersion (40 team observations) 
   
 
The figure also shows a line indicating the predicted winning probability for a given level 
of  the  Theil  index.  The  prediction  is  obtained  from  a  simple  probit  regression  over  666 
observations, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the team wins the match, and 0 
otherwise; the specification includes just the constant and the Theil index, based on either the 
whole team roster (top panel) or the ATM of each match (bottom panel). Comparing the two 
panels, we see that pay dispersion positively affects team performance when considering the 
whole team roster (top panel), whereas it has no impact when considering the ATMs (bottom 
panel). This suggests that results may change depending on how pay dispersion is measured. 
This  finding  warns  us  that  findings  may  change  depending  on  our  definition  of  what 
constitutes a “team.” 
We conclude this section with an exploratory analysis of the effect of pay dispersion on 
performance,  which  is  our  ultimate  goal.  Overall  in  the  data,  pay  dispersion  shows  no 
significant difference (t test: 0.37; p value: 0.712) when the match is won (average: 0.116) or 13 
when the match is drawn/lost (average: 0.114).
5 Table 3 then shows, separately for each team, 
the average pay, the average Theil index, and the wins ratio. Teams are listed as in Table 2, 
following their ranking at the end of the season. The first thing to note brings to mind the 
famous slogan “The more you spend, the more you get.” Indeed, teams that spend more (i.e., 
with a higher average pay) rank higher at the end of the season. In fact, our data exhibit a 
large Spearman’s rank correlation (0.701) between average team pay and the wins ratio in the 
season. The data thus suggest that better players are also better paid, and for this reason we 
can interpret the average pay of a team as a proxy for the average skill in the team. In contrast, 
pay dispersion is much less highly correlated with the wins ratio (the rank correlation is 
0.241), although the sign of this correlation is still positive. 
A problem with this analysis is that it completely ignores the specific characteristics of 
each team. For this reason, we now compare, separately for each team, the wins ratio obtained 
in two groups of matches, where the Theil index is either below or above the median for the 
team. The last column of Table 3 shows that the wins ratio is higher in the matches with high 
pay dispersion in only 11 cases out of 40. 
We  have  then  found  that,  looking  at  the  same  data,  one  can  interpret  the  relationship 
between team performance and pay dispersion as positive (considering all the team members: 
Figure  1,  top  panel),  null  (considering  the  ATMs:  Figure  1,  bottom  panel),  or  negative 
(considering the ATMs separately for each team: Table 3). Our empirical exercise in the next 
section further analyzes the relationship considering the ATMs, each match separately, and 
controlling for the most relevant characteristics of the team, the coach, the match, and the 
opponent. 
 
   
                                                 
5 Pay dispersion is not even affected by the team performance of the previous match (t test: 0.607; p value: 
0.544; average after a match won: 0.117; average after a match drawn/lost: 0.113). This suggests that the coach 
does not adjust it to keep the team compact in case of performance problems. 14 
TABLE 3. Pay and team performance 
A: 2009–2010 Season 
Team  Average 
pay  Theil index 
Wins ratio: average by matches 
(2) – (1) > 0  All  Low disp.  High disp. 
    (1)  (2) 
FC Internazionale Milano  4115.021  0.101  0.706  0.875  0.556  NO 
AS Roma  1718.652  0.232  0.471  0.375  0.556  YES 
AC Milan  3250.733  0.147  0.563  0.750  0.375  NO 
UC Sampdoria  724.647  0.393  0.412  0.750  0.111  NO 
US Città di Palermo  658.497  0.083  0.412  0.500  0.333  NO 
SSC Napoli  842.041  0.103  0.412  0.500  0.333  NO 
Juventus FC  2673.181  0.123  0.529  0.625  0.444  NO 
Parma FC  536.108  0.062  0.471  0.500  0.444  NO 
Genoa CFC  817.235  0.058  0.438  0.500  0.375  NO 
AS Bari  435.087  0.126  0.375  0.125  0.625  YES 
ACF Fiorentina  1177.068  0.072  0.438  0.250  0.625  YES 
SS Lazio  729.187  0.229  0.176  0.125  0.222  YES 
Catania Calcio  413.871  0.048  0.118  0.125  0.111  NO 
Cagliari Calcio  367.552  0.084  0.438  0.625  0.250  NO 
Udinese Calcio  464.575  0.103  0.313  0.250  0.375  YES 
AC Chievo Verona  380.442  0.042  0.412  0.500  0.333  NO 
Bologna FC  523.939  0.106  0.250  0.375  0.125  NO 
Atalanta Calcio  334.134  0.060  0.188  0.125  0.250  YES 
AS Siena  436.847  0.083  0.176  0.250  0.111  NO 
AS Livorno  358.900  0.125  0.294  0.500  0.111  NO 
B: 2010–2011 Season 
Team  Average 
pay  Theil index 
Wins ratio: average by matches 
(2) – (1) > 0  All  Low disp.  High disp. 
    (1)  (2) 
AC Milan  3590.499  0.191  0.647  0.750  0.556  NO 
FC Internazionale Milano  3250.635  0.167  0.400  0.429  0.375  NO 
SSC Napoli  918.736  0.102  0.588  0.625  0.556  NO 
Udinese Calcio  568.033  0.065  0.412  0.500  0.333  NO 
SS Lazio  1099.115  0.075  0.588  0.750  0.444  NO 
AS Roma  2049.492  0.177  0.471  0.625  0.333  NO 
Juventus FC  2034.127  0.119  0.471  0.500  0.444  NO 
US Città di Palermo  576.675  0.111  0.471  0.500  0.444  NO 
ACF Fiorentina  1024.088  0.108  0.313  0.250  0.375  YES 
Genoa CFC  1128.980  0.236  0.375  0.500  0.250  NO 
AC Chievo Verona  316.556  0.035  0.294  0.375  0.222  NO 
Parma FC  559.824  0.068  0.235  0.250  0.222  NO 
Cagliari Calcio  403.838  0.078  0.294  0.250  0.333  YES 
Catania Calcio  447.094  0.069  0.294  0.250  0.333  YES 
Bologna FC  555.712  0.119  0.294  0.125  0.444  YES 
AC Cesena  223.423  0.044  0.250  0.250  0.250  = 
US Lecce  300.007  0.023  0.235  0.375  0.111  NO 
UC Sampdoria  897.708  0.121  0.313  0.250  0.375  YES 
Brescia Calcio  359.365  0.195  0.235  0.250  0.222  NO 
AS Bari  482.681  0.093  0.118  0.250  0.000  NO 
Note: See note to Table 2. Average pay is in thousand euros. For each team we split matches in two groups 
based on whether the Theil index was below (low) or not below (high) the median value for the team. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we summarize our main findings regarding the effect of pay dispersion on team 
performance (Section 3.1). We then discuss some robustness checks around the definition of 
team members (Section 3.2), and we report the results of a further analysis connecting pay 
dispersion with individual performance (Section 3.3). 
 
3.1. Benchmark Analysis 
The first column of Table 4 reports the average marginal effects from our benchmark probit 
regression analysis. The column shows that pay dispersion has a negative impact on team 
performance: doubling pay dispersion, the probability of winning a match would reduce on 
average by 0.06. Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the predicted winning probability, conditional on 
pay dispersion and the other explanatory variables (fixed to their average), computed using 
this  probit  regression.  It  shows  that  probability  falls,  from  0.56  when  there  is  no  pay 
dispersion, to 0.24 when the Theil index is  0.50 T = . 
An example will help the reader understand this figure. Suppose you are the manager of a 
team, and you have to buy 11 new players who are expected to play all the next matches fully 
and on a regular basis. Your budget is limited, and you have to decide whether to buy (at the 
same total expenditure) either 1 top player and 10 average players, or instead 11 players with 
above-average  skill.  We  assume  their  pays  reflect  their  skill.  Further,  let  us  say  that  the 
average  pay  is  600  thousand  euros  (the  actual  pay  size  in  our  sample;  however,  this  is 
irrelevant for the pay dispersion index) and that the manager can choose to pay all 11 players 
the same amount (600 thousand euros) or 1 top player much more (1.5 million euros as 
opposed to 510 thousand euros for the other ones). In the latter case the top player will earn 
2.5 times the average pay, while each other player will earn 0.85 times the average pay; this 
pay distribution roughly corresponds to the median distribution in the sample. The resulting 
Theil index is  0.083 T = , whereas it is  0 T =  if all 11 players earn 600 thousand euros each. 
Hence,  higher  pay  dispersion  denotes  higher  variability  of  players’  skills.  Our  estimates 
suggest that, everything else being equal, the differentiated pay distribution will make the 
probability of winning a match fall on average by 20%, from 0.56 to 0.36. 
In our regression we also find significant evidence of a positive effect of average pay 
(doubling it would increase the probability of winning a match by around 0.15), replacing a 
coach during the season (the probability then increases by 0.12), and playing at home (0.25). 
In addition, we find significantly negative effects for the coach’s experience with the team 16 
(one  more  year  reduces  the  probability  of  winning  a  match  by  0.03)  and  the  opponent’s 
average  pay  (doubling  it  would  reduce  the  probability  by  0.17).  These  results  are  not 
surprising: on average, the pay can be seen as a proxy for a player’s skill (above we made an 
argument  about  this);  replacement  of  a  coach  during  the  season  may  have  a  large 
psychological impact on the players; a team playing in its home stadium may benefit from the 
support of its fans; the longer a coach is on the team, the lower is the strength of his effort and 
the psychological impact on the players; and the opponent’s average pay can also be seen as a 
proxy  for  its  skill,  which  then  lowers  the  winning  probability  of  the  team.  No  other 
explanatory variables—noticeably, those on the team characteristics and on the opponent’s 
pay dispersion—are significantly different from 0, at least at a 5% significance level.
6 
The “rho” coefficient, shown in the bottom part of Table 4, is the proportion of the total 
variance contributed by the team-level variance. This is statistically equal to 0, indicating that 
there are no team-specific intrinsic characteristics; that is, if we moved all the team members 
from  one  team  to  another,  their  performance  would  be  identical.  “Team  identity,”  or  the 
environment  in  which  they  are  trained  and  where  they  play,  does  not  influence  their 
performance. The consequence is that we could alternatively disregard the panel dimension of 
our data, and run our analysis with a probit regression on the pooled dataset. In what follows 
we then perform pooled probit regressions with team-clustered standard errors, because this 
approach is more efficient than using panel regression methods (fewer parameters have to be 
estimated). 
Section  B.1  of  the  Appendix  repeats  the  analysis,  also  treating  draws  as  a  positive 
outcome, and confirms our benchmark results. Moreover, Section B.2 reports the results of 
some robustness checks on the specification, where we substitute the Theil index with the 
Gini index (which actually shows a stronger significant effect: –0.13 rather than –0.06), or 
where  we  add  an  indicator  of  the  symmetry  of  the  pay  distribution  (eventually  not 
significant), a quadratic polynomial on pay dispersion, or the interaction between the index 
and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the team played a match in December. In the latter two 
cases, the purpose is to understand whether the effect of pay dispersion is non-monotonic or if 
it changes as team members get to know each other better. In neither case are the added 
variables significantly different from 0. In addition Section 3.3 discusses, among other things, 
the relationship between team performance and different technologies of production. 
                                                 
6 One could expect the coefficients for the team and the opponent to be mirrored, because when a team wins, its 
opponent loses the match, and in the analysis we include one observation for the team and one for the opponent. 
This is not true, however, when a match ends up in a draw (this happens in 25.53% of the observations), in 
which case the dependent variable is equal to 0 for both. 17 
TABLE 4. Team performance and pay dispersion (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Members:  ATM  Unweighted  Potential  Roster 
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.146***  0.142***  0.147***  0.076** 
    (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.039) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.061**  -0.058*  -0.046  0.167** 
    (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.082) 
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  0.095  0.040  0.059  0.044 
    (0.143)  (0.148)  (0.144)  (0.141) 
  Years on the team  0.015  0.011  0.020  0.006 
    (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.037) 
  Years in first division  0.002  -0.004  -0.006  0.006 
    (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
  Age  0.001  0.014  0.005*  0.009 
    (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.017) 
Coach:  New to the team  -0.091*  -0.086*  -0.089*  -0.116** 
    (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
  Replaced during the season  0.119**  0.115**  0.120**  0.108** 
    (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.056)  (0.048) 
  Years on the team  -0.034**  -0.033**  -0.032**  -0.033** 
    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
  Years in first division  0.010*  0.011**  0.011**  0.009* 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
  Age  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.006  -0.005  -0.004  -0.007 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  Disqualified players  0.040*  0.040*  0.040*  0.024 
    (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
  Home play  0.253***  0.250***  0.248***  0.256*** 
    (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.169***  -0.160***  -0.183***  -0.125*** 
    (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.037) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.030  0.018  0.015  -0.083 
    (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.095) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  0.139  0.206*  0.088  0.183 
    (0.105)  (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.153) 
  Years on the team  0.044*  0.048*  0.045  0.084** 
    (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.041) 
  Years in first division  0.001  0.004  0.012  -0.014 
    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.025) 
  Age  0.004  -0.007  -0.003**  -0.019 
    (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.020) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match 
  Log-likelihood  -371.461  -371.522  -370.738  -371.522 
  McFadden R
2  0.155  0.155  0.157  0.155 
  Count R
2  0.689  0.688  0.700  0.688 
  Rho coefficient  0.000       
  LR test rho =0  0.000       
    [0.496]       
Note: 666 observations on 40 teams (on average, 16.6 matches per team). The dependent variable is a dummy 
=1 in case of win. Pay and team statistics are based on ATM players (column 1); ATM players, not weighted by 
the amount of time they actually played (column 2); all potential players (starter players and substitute players; 
column 3); whole team roster (column 4). Team-clustered standard errors are given in parentheses; p values in 
brackets. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
3.2. Team Members 
We repeat the analysis with the same regression specification as in the benchmark case, but 
this time we consider different definitions of team members. As we have already seen, the 
definition affects the computation of the variables on pay, team, and opponent statistics that 
are all match specific. The effect of pay dispersion on team performance may then change 18 
with the definition of group. The average marginal effects from the analysis are shown in 
columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 4; the latest column is based on the broadest definition of 
team members. 
 
FIGURE 2. Predicted winning probability by pay dispersion 
    
Note: Predictions are based on the average explanatory variables and the parameter estimates from Table 4. 
 
Unweighted ATM 
We first consider the ATM, as in the benchmark, but disregarding the amount of time they 
actually played. For instance, if the match started with 11 players and then 3 substitutes also 
took part in the match, we derive our pay and players statistics from the characteristics of 14 
team members, without weights. 
Our results are reported in column (2) of Table 4, and they are close to the benchmark case 
of column (1). In particular, pay dispersion is still associated with a negative marginal effect 
of –0.06, although the effect is now significant at only 10%. This suggests that ignoring the 
amount of time spent in the field may create noise in the estimates. 
 
Potential players 
We then consider as team members all 18 athletes who were potentially able to play in the 
match because they were either starter players or substitute players. In this manner we exclude 
injured players, disqualified players, or players who are out of the match as a result of a 
decision made by the coach. All members are given the same weight, disregarding the number 19 
of minutes they actually played in the match. This definition of team members is less precise 
than our benchmark definition of ATMs, because at least four of these members in each 
match make no contribution to team performance, but they still affect the pay, team, and 
opponent statistics. 
Our results are shown in column (3) of Table 4. Most variables show effects that are in line 
with  the  benchmark  results;  however,  the  pay  dispersion  index  is  now  associated  with  a 
coefficient insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Entire team roster 
We conclude the analysis by considering as team members all athletes enrolled on the team, 
that is, the entire team roster, thus including injured, disqualified, and homegrown players. 
Hence, we consider the same team composition in each match, disregarding who actually 
played. This implies that, in our regression equation, the variables on pay and team statistics 
are  constant  for  a  given  team  (they  are  then  fixed  “team  effects”),  and  the  variables  on 
opponent statistics are constant for a given opponent team. Such an approach is similar to that 
of some previous works in the literature, because it does not pay attention to whether and how 
much each team member contributed to team performance. 
Our results are shown in column (4) of Table 4, and they are largely different from our 
benchmark analysis of column (1): we find a smaller effect of the team average pay (0.08 
instead of 0.15), while the effect of pay dispersion is now even positive: according to these 
estimates, doubling pay dispersion would increase the probability of winning by 0.17. In 
contrast, the remaining variables, which have not changed relative to the benchmark case 
(they  do  not  depend  on  the  definition  of  team  members),  provide  parameter  estimates 
comparable with those of the benchmark case. 
The results in Table 4 thus inform that, when broadening the definition of team (i.e., when 
going from column 1 to column 4), conclusions about the effects of pay dispersion change 
enormously: at a 5% level we may indeed find either a negative effect (column 1), a null 
effect (columns 2 and 3), or a positive one (column 4). Figure 2 plots the predicted winning 
probability, conditional on pay dispersion and the other explanatory variables (fixed to their 
average), computed separately from each of the four probit regressions in Table 4. From the 
figure it is clear that the direction of the effect goes from negative to positive as we use less 
information on the group definition, from panel (b) (where we ignore the amount of time 
actually played) to panel (c)  (where we consider all starter and substitute players), and on to 
panel (d) (where we include the whole team roster). 20 
This result warns that measurement of an effect can be biased if we do not consider a 
precise definition of what constitutes a “team.” Notice in particular that we find a positive 
effect when we look at the most general definition (whole team roster). Those who play little 
or not at all usually earn less than those who play regularly (see the Appendix, Section A.4, 
for  details).
  As  a  result,  pay  dispersion  increases  if  we  use  a  definition  of  team  that 
incorporates them; in particular, considering the entire team roster, the index is on average 
0.493,  as  opposed  to  0.114  if  we  consider  just  the  ATMs.  Pay  dispersion  increases 
significantly more in the top 10 teams at the end of December of each season: the average 
difference between the pay dispersion index computed from the team roster and from the 
ATMs is on average 0.437 among the top teams, as opposed to 0.321 among the other teams 
(t test: 16.512; p value: 0.000). The pay dispersion index then captures part of the effect of the 
team skill; indeed, the correlation between average pay and pay dispersion is 0.722 using the 
whole team roster, whereas it is only 0.253 using the ATM. This correlation may explain why 
in column (4) of Table 4 the effect of pay dispersion is positive, and the effect of average pay 
is about half the effect found in the other three columns. 
This suggests that our benchmark conclusions are not driven by a dataset with different 
features than others. Actually, our conclusions depend on the way we look at the data, and in 
particular on what we mean by “team members.” This may explain why in the literature we 
observe different results, and it shows the importance of the precision of the definition of 
team to evaluate the effect of pay dispersion. 
 
3.3. Individual Performance 
So  far  the  analysis  has  focused  on  objective  indicators  of  team  performance.  Team 
performance, however, derives from individual performance and cooperation among team 
members. It is then possible that we observe poor team performance because there is poor 
individual performance or because there is little cooperation. For instance, in soccer, we can 
observe a poor team performance when each player tries to score without passing the ball to 
other players (lack of cooperation) or when each player prefers not to take the initiative but 
instead passes the ball to other players, thereby delegating to them the responsibility to score 
(the lack of effort). One may thus wonder what determines the detrimental effect of pay 
dispersion on team performance. Does pay dispersion work as a disincentive to individual 
effort?  Alternatively,  does  pay  dispersion  merely  decrease  cooperation  between  players, 
leaving individual performance unchanged? These are the issues we want to address in this 
section. 21 
Our data suggest that teams that win more often make significantly more passes during the 
match.
7  In  Section  B.1  of  the  Appendix  we  report  the  output  of  a  within-group  panel 
regression analysis of the number of passes over the same specification as in the benchmark. 
We find no significant effect of pay dispersion. If we see the number of passes as a proxy for 
team  cooperation,  we  interpret  this  finding  as  an  indication  that  team  cooperation  is  not 
affected  by  pay  dispersion.  If  our  argument  is  correct,  team  performance  should  then  be 
affected solely by individual performance.
8 
Obtaining an objective and thorough measurement of individual performance is impossible 
in  our  environment,  because  soccer  is  a  team  sport  where  few  individual  statistics  are 
recorded compared to other sports such as baseball. (See, e.g., Scully [1974] for an analysis of 
the connection between individual performance and individual pay.) In addition, those few 
existing  individual  statistics  record  rare  events  (e.g.,  goals,  assists,  yellow  cards)  and  are 
highly role specific (e.g., a forward player is more likely to score a goal than any other 
player). It would be difficult to use these statistics as measures of individual performance. 
In Italy, however, it is quite common for journalists, when writing a newspaper report 
about a match, to assign a “mark” to each single player’s performance. The mark is a number 
based on a scale from 0 to 10; a mark of 6 denotes fair performance and higher marks indicate 
good  or  excellent  performance.  This  mark  represents  a  subjective  individual  performance 
assessment (SIPA), because it is based only on the arbitrary opinion and taste of the journalist 
who attended the match. Still, it is a rough indicator of the individual performance of each 
team member and can be used to look at the effect of pay dispersion on individual team 
members. In this regard we collected all of the SIPAs for the players involved in the 333 
matches considered in the main analysis, using the three major sport newspapers in Italy: La 
Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere dello Sport, and Tutto Sport. To make SIPAs less heavily 
affected by the personal opinion of the journalists, we took an average SIPA from the three 
newspapers (the SIPAs from the three sources show a correlation of around 0.7). Overall we 
have 8,226 observations on 876 players (434 in the  2009–2010 season and 442 in the 2010–
                                                 
7 We split the 40 teams in two groups, depending on their wins ratio. The 20 teams winning more frequently on 
average make 410.47 passes, significantly more than the other teams making on average 383.52 passes (t test: 
1.876; p value: 0.034). 
8 Contrary to team performance, this result is robust to any definition of team. In contrast Pfeffer and Langton 
(1993) find a negative effect of pay dispersion on collaboration in academic research. The academic 
environment, however, is not appropriate to assess team effort: researchers may keep working with no 
cooperation, or they may cooperate with researchers in other universities. This situation is hard to find in most 
jobs, and certainly not in soccer.  22 
2011 season)
9, who then played an average of 9.39 matches each. In a separate analysis, 
available in the Appendix, Section B.3, we take the SIPAs from the major sport newspaper, 
La Gazzetta dello Sport, and add in the specification dummy variables on the journalist who 
made the SIPA. Our main conclusions are confirmed, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of SIPAs in our sample. We see that SIPAs are concentrated 
between 4 and 9, with a peak around 6 (fair performance). 
 
FIGURE 3. Distribution of individual SIPAs (8,226 observations) 
  
 
Table 5 reports some summary statistics at the player level. First of all, we notice that 
SIPAs are generally higher when the team wins a match (see the Appendix, Section A.4, for 
more details). However, low SIPAs are possible also in this case: players may indeed receive 
a SIPA of 4 even if their team wins the match. Moreover, the table lists some statistics about  
the main player’s characteristics: his pay, his age, his past experience with the team and the 
first division, and his role (midfielder, forward, as opposed to goalkeeper or defender). We 
observe wide heterogeneity on these variables. 
SIPAs show a weakly positive correlation with individual salaries (0.09) and team average 
pay (0.05), and a weakly negative correlation with pay dispersion (–0.05). It is also interesting 
to  understand  which  “technology  of  production”—meant  as  a  combination  of  individual 
SIPAs—determines team performance. If we regressed team performance over the minimum, 
mean, and maximum SIPAs of the team in the match (controlling for team, coach, match, 
opponent, and time characteristics), we would find all coefficients to be significant at 1%, 
                                                 
9 This number is smaller than that for the players who played at least for one minute, 925, because marks are 
given only to those who play a significant portion of the match. The decision on what is a “significant portion of 
the match” is subjective, and different journalists may have different opinions. 23 
suggesting that different technologies coexist. However, the average marginal effect of the 
mean SIPA is quantitatively much higher: 0.717, as opposed to –0.069 for the minimum SIPA 
and  0.129  for  the  maximum  SIPA.  This  suggests  that  team  performance  depends  on  the 
individual effort of all players, more than on the effort of the best/worst ones. 
 
TABLE 5. Summary statistics, individual players (8,226 observations on 876 players) 
Variable  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
SIPA           
If win  6.333  6.308  0.563  4  8.833 
If draw  6  5.968  0.504  4  7.833 
If defeat  5.667  5.631  0.531  4  7.833 
OVERALL  6  5.966  0.611  4  8.833 
Individual variables           
Pay (thousands of euros)  600  1029.200  1255.642  30  10500 
Pay/average pay  0.920  0.997  0.496  0.010  4.348 
New to the team  0  0.271  0.445  0  1 
Years on the team  1  2.287  2.679  0  18 
Years in first division  4  4.789  3.807  0  18 
Age  27  27.429  3.954  17  41 
Midfield role  0  0.399  0.490  0  1 
Forward role  0  0.191  0.393  0  1 
 
The analysis in this section is meant to help us understand the link between individual 
performance and pay dispersion using an approach similar to that of our benchmark analysis. 
For this purpose we run a regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the individual 
SIPA, and the specification includes variables on the player (pay relative to the average pay, 
age, experience, and role), as well as the same variables used in Table 4. We consider ATMs 
as team members to construct our statistics. Table 6 shows the output from this regression, 
where we estimate the coefficients using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) method with 
player-clustered standard errors (column 1), a random-effect (RE) panel GLS method (column 
2), or a fixed-effect (FE) panel OLS method (column 3); the latter method does not allow us 
to separate the effect of match-invariant variables from the player-specific effect. The “rho” 
coefficient reported in the bottom part of the table suggests that, in this context, it is important 
to consider player-specific effects. Moreover, the statistical tests comparing the three models, 
reported at the end of the table, suggest that it is advisable to use a panel method. 
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TABLE 6. Individual performance and pay dispersion (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  Pooled OLS  RE GLS  FE OLS 
Player:  Pay/average pay  0.105***  0.110***  -0.220 
    (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.172) 
  New to the team  -0.002  -0.004   
    (0.026)  (0.023)   
  Years on the team  0.014***  0.015***   
    (0.005)  (0.005)   
  Years in first division  -0.005  -0.005   
    (0.004)  (0.004)   
  Age  0.001  0.000   
    (0.003)  (0.003)   
  Midfield role  0.047**  0.050***   
    (0.019)  (0.019)   
  Forward role  -0.015  -0.014   
    (0.028)  (0.026)   
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.082***  0.080***  -0.253 
    (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.196) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.064***  -0.080***  -0.139*** 
    (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.024) 
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  0.053  0.023  -0.007 
    (0.073)  (0.071)  (0.115) 
  Years on the team  -0.006  -0.012  -0.026 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.025) 
  Years in first division  0.001  0.002  -0.007 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.018) 
  Age  -0.009  -0.003  0.014 
    (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.016) 
Coach:  New to the team  -0.008  0.003  0.094 
    (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.098) 
  Replaced during the season  -0.016  0.012  0.134** 
    (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.059) 
  Years on the team  -0.011  -0.009  0.055* 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.033) 
  Years in first division  0.007**  0.007**  -0.001 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.011) 
  Age  0.001  0.002  0.004 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.010**  -0.006  -0.000 
    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
  Disqualified players  0.048***  0.056***  0.072*** 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
  Home play  0.144***  0.144***  0.140*** 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.042***  -0.043***  -0.048*** 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.055***  0.053***  0.053*** 
    (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  0.035  0.058  0.120** 
    (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
  Years on the team  -0.001  0.003  0.011 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  Years in first division  0.004  0.005  0.009 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Age  0.007  0.007  0.003 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Constant  5.443***  5.217***  7.126*** 
    (0.308)  (0.276)  (1.521) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match 
  R
2  0.041  0.040  0.000 
  Rho coefficient    0.063  0.380 
  Test pooled vs. panel    276.810  1.930 
      [0.000]  [0.000] 
Note: 8,226 observations on 876 players (on average, 9.39 matches per player). The dependent variable is the 
average SIPA from three newspapers. Standard errors are given in parentheses; p values in brackets. In column 
1 we report player-clustered standard errors. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
Our main findings are as follows. In columns (1) and (2), where we can estimate the effects 
of match-invariant variables, we find positive effects for individual pay, years of experience 
with the team, and the midfield role of the player (a core role in soccer). The direction of all 25 
of these effects is intuitive. Notice in particular that a high relative pay seems to work as an 
incentive on individual performance; this result is in line, for instance, with the results of 
Pfeffer and Langton (1993). However, giving a disproportionately high pay to some is not 
necessarily an effective strategy. In fact, it may give rise to high pay dispersion, and in Table 
6 we consistently find a negative effect for the team pay dispersion. In addition, we find 
positive effects for playing at home, number of disqualified players, and the opponent’s pay 
dispersion, and a negative effect for the opponent’s average pay. 
In the Appendix, Section B.4, we repeat the same analysis, adding into the specification 
variables that consider whether the player is a “superstar” (when he earns at least two times 
the average pay in the team) or a “regular player” (one of the 11 most frequent players in the 
first month of the season), alone and interacting with pay dispersion. Interestingly, we find 
that SIPA increases with regular players, and responds more negatively to pay dispersion 
among superstars. In particular the first result suggests that infrequent players, when they 
have “all eyes on them” during the match, are not able to perform as well as the regular 
players for whom they substitute. 
Figure  4  reports  the  predicted  SIPA  conditional  on  pay  dispersion  and  the  average 
explanatory variables, using the estimates from column (2) of Table 6. We focus on this 
column, rather than column (3), because it shows a lower effect of pay dispersion (–0.08 
instead of –0.14), and overall it provides more convincing estimates—in particular, because it 
shows significant effects as a result of the players’ and team salaries. As its counterpart for 
team performance (panel [a] of Figure 2), the figure shows that the SIPA is the highest when 
there is no pay dispersion at all. This suggests that pay dispersion has a detrimental effect not 
just  on  team  performance,  but  that  it  also  negatively  impacts  individual  performance.  To 
interpret this figure, we return to our previous example with the team manager. 
Let us say that the manager has to choose whether to increase or decrease the current pay 
dispersion (where 1 player earns 2.5 times the average income, and each of the 10 remaining 
players  earns  0.85  times  the  average  income).  The  outcome  of  this  choice  is  not  trivial, 
because varying the distribution of pays affects not only pay dispersion, but also the average 
pay and the players’ pay, which in turn have different implications on individual performance. 
To  keep  the  situation  simple,  let  us  say  that  the  manager  has  a  budget  balance  and  he 
considers two alternatives that do not alter average pay: in plan A, the top player earns three 
times the average pay, and each remaining player earns 0.8 times the average pay; in plan B, 
the top player earns two times the average pay, and each remaining player earns 0.9 times the 26 
average pay. The corresponding Theil index goes from an initial level of  0.083 T =  to either 
0.137 T =  in plan A or  0.040 T =  in plan B. 
We know from Table 6 that an increase in player’s pay has a positive effect on individual 
performance,  while  an  increase  in  pay  dispersion  has  a  negative  effect.  As  a  result,  the 
direction of the effect on the top player is unclear a priori, while we already know that in plan 
A the performance of the lower-paid players will fall, and in plan B their performance will 
rise. With these numbers we find that, in plan A the SIPA of the top player will rise by 0.015 
points, whereas the SIPA of each other player will fall by 0.046 points. In plan B, the SIPA of 
the top player will rise by 0.003 points (notwithstanding a reduction of his pay), while the 
SIPA of each other player will rise by 0.064 points. All in all, the effect on the top player is 
lower than that on the other players. This, together with the fact that there is just one top 
player, but 10 other players suggests that plan B is preferable, because it increases the average 
SIPA by 0.058 points; in contrast, plan A reduces the average SIPA by 0.04 points. 
 
FIGURE 4. Predicted SIPA, by pay dispersion 
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4. Conclusions 
A  team  organization  is  common  in  the  workplace,  and  the  use  of  teamwork  has  been 
increasing  over  time  (Lazear  and  Shaw  2007).  For  this  reason,  studying  the  impact  of 
incentives on team performance is an important field of research. However, previous literature 
on the effect of pay dispersion is controversial: some authors think that pay dispersion may 
provide an extra incentive for employees’ increased efforts, whereas other authors think that it 
may  reduce  motivation  and  team  cohesiveness.  The  two  effects  may  even  coexist. 
Unfortunately,  previous  evidence  does  not  provide  a  clear  message;  it  suggests  that  the 
estimated effect on team performance can be positive, null, or negative. 
In this paper we collect a unique dataset of matches played during two seasons of the 
men’s major soccer league in Italy. This unique dataset allows us to measure the effect of pay 
dispersion according to different definitions of team. This peculiarity of our dataset is the 
crucial element that can explain the conflicting evidence. Indeed, we also find positive, null, 
and negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the same data but different 
definitions of team. However, when we take the narrowest definition of a team—considering 
only  the  members  who  actually  took  part  in  the  task  and  how  long  they  played—pay 
dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance: doubling pay dispersion decreases 
by 6% the probability of winning a match. This result is consistent with several robustness 
checks. 
This negative effect of pay dispersion on team performance may be the reason why salaries 
are usually kept secret within a firm (see Lawler 1990, 238–42). Employees do not like to 
earn less than their coworkers; as a result, pay dispersion can decrease cooperation within the 
team and it may affect individual performance. We investigate this issue in our environment 
by  looking  at  the  number  of  passes  within  a  match  and  the  (subjective)  individual 
performance assessments reported by the three most important Italian sports newspapers. Our 
results show that higher pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on individual evaluations, 
whereas it does not have a significant effect on cooperation. 
Our results hold for any level of pay given the dimensionless nature of our pay dispersion 
index.  Therefore,  the  external  validity  of  our  analysis  goes  beyond  this  specific  sports 
environment. Actually, the fact that in the sport environment salaries can be high is a nice 
feature of our dataset, because it allows use to study a large variety of pay dispersions. 
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Appendix A: Data and Environment 
 
A.1.  Salary and Salary Imputation 
Each soccer player receives a salary that is defined through an individual agreement with the 
team, usually negotiated on a yearly basis at the end of the season. A salary is made of a fixed 
component and (sometimes) a variable component. The variable component, more frequent 
with top players, is linked to the performance of the team (e.g., winning a competition) or the 
ad hoc performance of the single player (e.g., number of goals scored, number of assists 
made). Further revenue, also more frequent with top players, may be generated by doing 
advertising endorsements for sports and non–sports-related firms. In our analysis we consider 
only the fixed component of the pay, which is the only amount known to us and the team 
members. Ignoring the variable component of a salary, as well as revenues generated from 
advertising  endorsements,  probably  underestimates  pay  dispersion  (because  it  more  likely 
occurs in players who already earn high salaries). 
In our sample 925 players have played at least one match for one minute or more. We are 
aware of the salaries of 874 of them (94.49%); for the remaining 51 players, pay imputation is 
necessary. Imputation applies to two categories of players (33 reserve players and 18 home-
grown players) having a marginal role in the team, because they are employed in case of an 
emergency  (injury  or  disqualification  of  the  main  players)  to  get  the  legal  number  of  18 
players (11 starter players and 7 substitute players) in a match. These players have played on 
average 1.66 matches in the sample, and for roughly 1 minute out of 90; hence, imputation 
has a negligible impact on our statistics. 
We impute the salary of reserve players as follows: we assign them the pay they earned in 
the other season in our dataset, when applicable; otherwise, we assign them the lowest pay in 
the team. The reason is that the salaries of these players are not likely to be negotiated every 
year, and they are comparable to those of (low-skill) regular players. 
We adopt a different imputation rule for homegrown players. These are players ages 20 or 
younger who regularly play for the team, but in another league specifically devoted to them 
(campionato primavera). The salaries of these players are typically much lower than those of 
other  players,  and  they  are  renegotiated  on  a  yearly  or  longer  basis.  This  means  that  a 
homegrown player, even if he becomes important for the team and plays a large number of 
matches during the season, will still earn a very low wage up to the end of the season. In our 
sample we set this type of player’s net annual pay uniformly to the level of 30 thousand euros 31 
per year
1; this is very low, compared to the median pay of 582,879 euros we observe in our 
sample, but still well above the average wage in the country (17 thousand euros for a full-time 
male employee; source: Istat 2011). 
 
A.2.  January Players’ Transfer Market 
In Italy as well as in the other European countries, the players’ transfer market takes place 
twice a year: the main market arises between July and August, when no league is active, while 
the second one is held in January, when the league is going on. This second (winter) transfer 
market is often exploited to repair mistakes made during the summer market, or to recover 
from unexpectedly poor rankings in the league. For this reason, the number of transferred 
players is usually large: during the January markets of 2010 and 2011, a total of 150 players 
were bought and 159 players were sold in Serie A, generating overall expenses of 182 million 
euros  and  revenues  for  122  million  euros.  These  transfer  movements  are  relatively  large 
compared to the summer market: in the two seasons under investigation, the Serie A teams 
had summer market expenditures of 739 million euros and revenues of 795 million euros 
(source: www.transfermarkt.it). 
Table A1 lists the number of January transfers made by each team in each season (data are 
taken from www.fullsoccer.eu) and the resulting changes in team composition. We observe 
largely different behavior, even for the same team in different seasons (e.g., in 2011 Bologna 
FC bought and sold six new players, while in 2010 it just bought one new player). The last 
column reports the ratio of new players in each team at the end of the January market. Again, 
we observe large variety, with the number of new players going from 3.13% to 27.59% of the 
team members; on average, roughly 12% of the players enrolled in Serie A came to their team 
through the January transfer market. This proportion is not negligible, and certainly these new 
players contribute to the subsequent team performance in a significant manner. 
   
                                                 
1 The minimum pay for soccer players ages 19 or older is set to 20,000 EUR gross of taxes. We take a higher pay 
because some bargaining is allowed to the teams. 32 
TABLE A1. Players’ transfer market statistics 
A: 2009–2010 Season 










FC Internazionale Milano  3  4  35  34  0.088 
AS Roma  1  7  33  27  0.037 
AC Milan  3  2  35  36  0.083 
UC Sampdoria  5  4  26  27  0.185 
US Città di Palermo  3  4  33  32  0.094 
SSC Napoli  1  3  29  27  0.037 
Juventus FC  3  3  33  33  0.091 
Parma FC  6  5  28  29  0.207 
Genoa CFC  6  7  33  32  0.188 
AS Bari  5  5  38  38  0.132 
ACF Fiorentina  4  3  29  30  0.133 
SS Lazio  5  3  33  35  0.143 
Catania Calcio  2  1  29  30  0.067 
Cagliari Calcio  3  2  33  34  0.088 
Udinese Calcio  4  3  36  37  0.108 
AC Chievo Verona  2  1  29  30  0.067 
Bologna FC  6  6  30  30  0.200 
Atalanta Calcio  4  4  30  30  0.133 
AS Siena  5  4  30  31  0.161 
AS Livorno  6  3  30  33  0.182 
TOTAL  77  74  632  635  0.121 
B: 2010–2011 Season 










AC Milan  5  2  31  34  0.147 
FC Internazionale Milano  4  6  33  31  0.129 
SSC Napoli  2  2  28  28  0.071 
Udinese Calcio  1  5  32  28  0.036 
SS Lazio  1  2  32  31  0.032 
AS Roma  1  3  33  31  0.032 
Juventus FC  3  4  38  37  0.081 
US Città di Palermo  3  4  33  32  0.094 
ACF Fiorentina  3  3  32  32  0.094 
Genoa CFC  7  9  33  31  0.226 
AC Chievo Verona  4  7  29  26  0.154 
Parma FC  5  5  30  30  0.167 
Cagliari Calcio  3  3  30  30  0.100 
Catania Calcio  3  5  33  31  0.097 
Bologna FC  1  0  30  31  0.032 
AC Cesena  7  5  30  32  0.219 
US Lecce  1  2  29  28  0.036 
UC Sampdoria  8  8  29  29  0.276 
Brescia Calcio  4  5  34  33  0.121 
AS Bari  7  5  32  34  0.206 
TOTAL  73  85  631  619  0.118 
Note: Teams are listed according to their position at the end of the season; teams promoted from second division 
are highlighted. Players’ market for the 2009–2010 season started on January 7, 2010, and ended on February 
1, 2010; players’ market for the 2010–2011 season started on January 2, 2011, and ended on January 31, 2011. 
 
A.3.  Pay Dispersion, Pay, and Skewness 
Figure A1 plots the average pay against pay dispersion (Theil index) in our 666 observations. 
Both measures vary enormously: the average pay varies between 200 thousand euros and 
more than 4 million euros, while the pay dispersion index ranges between 0 and 0.5 (the 
theoretical maximum is  ( ) ln 11 2.4 =  in the hypothetical case where the team pays only one 33 
athlete,  who  plays  the  whole  match).  The  correlation  between  pay  and  pay  dispersion, 
however, is not strong (0.389); this is the consequence of having the pay dispersion index 
normalized by the pay level. 
 
FIGURE A1. Team average pay and pay dispersion (666 observations) 
  
 
In  addition,  pay  dispersion  has  a  relatively  stronger  correlation  (0.477)  with  the  usual 
skewness index. Using the notation in Section 2.2, the index is defined for team  x in match t  
as follows: 
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More importantly, in 567 out of 666 cases the asymmetry index  , xt A  is positive. This indicates 
that pay dispersion usually arises when one or a few players are earning less than the others, 
rather than when one or a few players are earning more than the others. 
 
A.4.  Individual Performance 
Figure A2 shows an example of the SIPA ratings (pagelle in Italian) taken from the main 
Italian sport newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport. The example is for the 12th match of the 
2010–2011  season  between  FC  Internazionale  Milano  and  AC  Milan.  The  match  was 
eventually won by AC Milan. 
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FIGURE A2. An example of SIPA 
 
 
Figure  A3  connects  individual  performance  with  team  performance,  by  plotting  the 
average SIPA of each player against the wins ratio over all matches he played. The figure 
suggests  that  the  two  measures  of  performance  are  positively  correlated.  However,  the 
correlation is not strong (0.327 in the sample), which indicates that individual performance 
may still vary enormously conditional on team performance. 
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FIGURE A3. Individual performance and team performance 
 
 
In our sample, SIPAs and Theil indexes show a –0.05 correlation. Figure A4 plots this 
graphically, by comparing the average SIPA of each player with the average Theil index over 
all matches he played. 
FIGURE A4. Individual performance and pay dispersion 
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Individual performance is also generally higher in those players who play more frequently. 
To show this, we rank players in terms of the total amount of time they played in the 17 
matches of the season. The 11 members who played most of the time in each team received an 
average SIPA of 6.014, against an average SIPA of 5.842 for the others. This difference is 
statistically significant to a t test (11.546; p value: 0). More frequent players also earn higher 
salaries on average: their average pay is 1,096 thousand euros, significantly higher (t test: 
4.619; p value: 0) than the average pay (750 thousand euros) of all the other team members 
who played for at least one minute during the 17 matches. 
In the analysis of the Appendix, Section B.4, we include a dummy variable that considers 
whether the player is a “regular” player. The purpose of this is to detect if the player is one of 
the 11 who are expected to play on the team more than all of the other teammates. We define 
as regular players the 11 who, in each team, played most of the time during the first month of 
the season (i.e., in the 5 matches up to the end of September). We rank players according to 5 
rather  than  17  matches  to  avoid  potential  endogeneity  issues:  after  many  matches,  team 
members  playing  more  often  are  likely  doing  so  because  their  individual  performance  is 
higher, while after the first few matches team members playing often are more likely doing so 
because they are just supposed to be better players. 
Other “behavioral” reasons may explain the exclusion of some players from the team. Let 
us  give  a  concrete  example  from  the  Italian  soccer  league.  In  2007  a  small  team,  UC 
Sampdoria, hired Antonio Cassano, at that time considered one of the best Italian soccer 
players. His salary was 5.64 times higher than the average salary of the other players in the 
team  and,  as  a  result,  his  impact  on  pay  dispersion  was  huge.  In  the  2010–2011  season 
Cassano regularly played the first matches, until a conflict with the team president excluded 
him from the team roster. Cassano was eventually sold to another team in January 2011; at the 
end of the season UC Sampdoria was relegated to the second division. However, these cases 
are rare: it turns out that 362 of the 440 team members (82.27%) who played more frequently 
in the first 17 matches are also among the most frequent players after the first 5 matches. 
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
 
B.1.  Team Performance: Dependent Variable 
 
Wins and draws 
Our analysis concentrates solely on the probability of winning a match. However, in soccer a 
draw is also a valuable outcome, because it returns one point (compared to three points for a 
win and no points for a defeat) that is useful for the final ranking for the season. In some 
circumstances (for instance, when weak teams play against strong teams) teams may play to 
conclude a match with a draw. 
We consider this case using three models. First, we run a probit regression model with the 
same specification as in the benchmark analysis, but where the dependent variable is now 
equal to 1 if the team either wins or draws the match. Our findings are shown in column (1) of 
Table  B1.  The  main  results  are  preserved,  and  doubling  pay  dispersion  now  makes  the 
probability of winning or drawing a match decrease by 0.05. 
Second, we consider an ordered probit regression, treating separately each outcome (win, 
draw, and defeat) in the dependent variable. Column (2) of Table B1 reports the average 
marginal effects for the outcome “win.” We still find a significant effect of the variables that 
are  significant  in  the  benchmark  analysis.  In  particular,  doubling  the  average  pay  would 
increase by 16% the probability of winning a match, while doubling pay dispersion would 
decrease it by 5.7%. 
Third, we consider an OLS regression of the number of points on the same specification 
(column 3 of Table B1). Again, the main conclusions are confirmed. In particular, we find 
that  doubling  the  average  pay  would  generate  an  average  increase  of  0.48  points,  while 
doubling pay dispersion would generate an average reduction of 0.17 points earned. 
 
Team cooperation 
Pay dispersion may affect team performance in two ways: through individual performance 
and  through  team  cooperation.  In  Section  3.3  of  the  main  text,  we  look  at  individual 
performance; here we focus on team cooperation. We measure team cooperation in terms of 
the number of passes made during the match. The idea is that the higher this number, the 
higher the level of cooperation within the team. 
Column (4) of Table B1 shows the results of a fixed-effect (FE) panel OLS regression 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of passes, and the specification is 38 
the same as in the benchmark analysis. In this case, a panel model with fixed effects seems 
preferable to both a panel model with random effects and a pooled OLS model (see the tests 
listed at the bottom of the table). The reason is probably that different teams have different 
playing styles that influence the number of passes. Using this model we are then able to 
measure the effect of pay dispersion net of the playing style (captured in the fixed effect). 
We find a strong effect of the average pay for both the team (+0.207) and the opponent (–
0.091): doubling the average pay increases the number of passes by 20.7%, while doubling 
the opponent’s average pay reduces the number of passes by 9.1%. In contrast, we find no 
significant effect of pay dispersion. This suggests that pay dispersion has no implications on 
team cooperation. 
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TABLE B1. Team performance: dependent variable (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  Pr(win /draw)  Pr(win)  Points  Log(passes) 
Method:  Probit  Ord. probit  OLS  FE OLS 
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.181***  0.160***  0.484***  0.207** 
    (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.076)  (0.086) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.053**  -0.057**  -0.173**  0.002 
    (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.075)  (0.022) 
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  -0.085  -0.018  0.094  0.010 
    (0.116)  (0.119)  (0.382)  (0.100) 
  Years on the team  -0.030  -0.010  -0.003  -0.002 
    (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.071)  (0.022) 
  Years in first division  0.002  0.002  0.005  -0.010 
    (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.049)  (0.016) 
  Age  -0.004  0.001  -0.002  -0.004 
    (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.048)  (0.014) 
Coach:  New to the team  0.003  -0.034  -0.180  -0.087 
    (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.132)  (0.086) 
  Replaced during the season  0.040  0.074*  0.254*  -0.050 
    (0.048)  (0.040)  (0.126)  (0.053) 
  Years on the team  -0.046***  -0.039***  -0.118***  -0.032 
    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.041)  (0.029) 
  Years in first division  0.000  0.005  0.021  0.011 
    (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.010) 
  Age  0.004  0.002  0.005  0.004 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.009  -0.007  -0.021  -0.005 
    (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.027)  (0.004) 
  Disqualified players  0.059**  0.051**  0.145**  0.003 
    (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.063)  (0.010) 
  Home play  0.244***  0.245***  0.745***  0.009 
    (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.094)  (0.012) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.141***  -0.154***  -0.485***  -0.091*** 
    (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.078)  (0.012) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.049*  0.038  0.108  0.011 
    (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.072)  (0.011) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  -0.053  0.058  0.254  -0.013 
    (0.143)  (0.098)  (0.295)  (0.053) 
  Years on the team  0.001  0.024  0.096  -0.009 
    (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.063)  (0.009) 
  Years in first division  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002 
    (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.006) 
  Age  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.013** 
    (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.041)  (0.006) 
  Constant      0.190  4.878*** 
        (1.953)  (0.684) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match 
  Log-likelihood  -373.435  -641.663     
  McFadden R
2  0.151  0.111     
  Count R
2  0.701       
  R
2      0.215  0.211 
  Rho coefficient      0.148  0.433 
  Test pooled vs. panel      0.980  4.320 
        [0.507]  [0.000] 
Note:  666  observations  on  40  teams  (on  average,  16.6  matches  per  team).  Dependent  variable:  a  dummy 
variable =1 in case of a win or draw (column 1); variable = 0 in case of a defeat, = 1 in case of a draw, and =2 
in case of a win (column 2, showing marginal effects in case of a win); the number of points (column 3); the 
logarithm  of  the  number  of  assists  in  the  match  (column  4).  Team-clustered  standard  errors  are  given  in 
parentheses; p values in brackets. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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B.2.  Team Performance: Specification 
 
Pay dispersion index 
A popular statistic to measure (salary) inequality is the Gini index, defined as half the average 
absolute difference between any two salaries, divided by the average pay. Using the notation 
of Section 2.2 in the main text, the formula is: 
( )
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  This statistic is bounded between 0 and 1, with a value of 0 showing perfect equality (with 
every team member having equal pay), and a value of 1 showing maximum inequality (where 
only one team member is paid). 
Despite its popularity, this index has a major shortcoming that makes us prefer a different 
dispersion index, the Theil index, in our benchmark analysis. The shortcoming is that two 
different pay distributions can have the same Gini index. For instance, consider a distribution 
where eight individuals earn 1 and two individuals earn 4 (the average pay is then 1.6), and 
another pay distribution where five individuals earn 1 and five earn 4 (the average is then 
2.5).  The  Gini  index  is  worth  0.33  in  both  cases,  even  though  the  two  distributions  are 
different and pay dispersion looks higher in the latter case. 
In column (1) of Table B2, however, we report the results of a regression analysis using 
this  index  instead  of  the  Theil  index.  Our  results  are  largely  confirmed,  and  actually  the 
marginal effect of the pay dispersion index is quantitatively larger than in the benchmark 
analysis (it is now –0.126 instead of –0.061). This suggests that by doubling pay dispersion, 
the probability of winning a match would be reduced by 0.13 rather than by 0.06. Hence, our 
benchmark analysis actually seems conservative in terms of the size of the effect. 
 
Skewness 
Pay  dispersion  may  arise  when  most  salaries  are  concentrated  in  the  lowest  end  of  the 
distribution (negative skewness; left asymmetry) or when most salaries are concentrated in the 
highest end of the distribution (positive skewness; right asymmetry); in the Appendix, Section 
A.3, we showed that the latter situation is more frequent in our data. One may thus wonder 
whether the direction of the asymmetry in the distribution also affects team performance. For 
this purpose we repeat the benchmark analysis adding into the specification a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the pay distribution is skewed positively, and 0 otherwise. The former case 41 
denotes a situation in which most salaries are relatively high, and few salaries are relatively 
small. 
Findings from this analysis are reported in column (2) of Table B2. The newly added 
variable is not significant, suggesting that skewness does not affect performance, while all the 
other variables remain virtually unchanged with respect to the benchmark case. 
 
Nonlinear effect of pay dispersion 
So far we have assumed a linear relationship between team performance and pay dispersion. 
This may be too restrictive. For this reason we now consider a quadratic specification for 
(log) pay dispersion. Our results are reported in column (3) of Table B2. The findings are in 
line  with  our  benchmark  analysis;  regarding  the  dispersion  index,  its  logarithm  is  now 
significantly negative only at the 10% significance level, while its squared value turns out to 
be insignificantly different from zero. A chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis of joint 
significance of the two parameters only at a 10% level (test: 5.35; p value: 0.069). This 
suggests that a quadratic polynomial does not provide a good fit to the data. In fact, Figure B1 
shows the predicted probability of winning a match for an average team, conditional on the 
level of the pay dispersion index. We see that the prediction is very close to the benchmark 
one in panel (a) of Figure 2 in the main text. The only difference arises at very small pay 
dispersion  indexes;  in  fact,  using  the  specification  with  the  quadratic  polynomial,  the 
probability of winning a match is maximized when pay dispersion is set to 0.023. However, 
similar pay dispersion rarely occurred in our dataset: in fact, only 16 observations out of 666 
show a lower index. In our dataset a similar pay dispersion index was found for AC Chievo 
Verona in the first match of the 2010–2011 season, where the ATMs were earning 500 (1 
player), 380 (2), 350 (4), 300 (4), 250 (1), and 230 (2) thousand euros, for a weighted average 
pay of 321.35 thousand euros. 
 
   42 
FIGURE B1. Predicted winning probability by pay dispersion: squared effect 
 
Note: Predictions are based on the average explanatory variables and the parameter estimates from Table B2, 
column (3). 
 
Effect of pay dispersion over time 
Everything else being equal, the effect of pay dispersion may depend on how much team 
members know each other. In each season, several new players usually enter the team, often 
just a few days before the season starts. For a player, knowledge of other team members and 
their salaries may take time. It may then be that pay dispersion has a stronger effect in the 
latest matches we consider. For this reason we consider a specification where we add the 
interaction between the pay dispersion index and a dummy variable equal to 1 in the latest 
month of matches (those played in December, as opposed to the August–November period). 
Our findings are reported in column (4) of Table B2. The interaction is not significant, 
suggesting that pay dispersion has an instantaneous effect on team members. Again, the other 
variables show an effect similar to that of the benchmark case. 
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TABLE B2. Team performance: specification (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model:  Gini index  Skewness  Square  Late 
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.145***  0.144***  0.140***  0.146*** 
    (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.126**  -0.065**  -0.177*  -0.056* 
    (0.064)  (0.029)  (0.091)  (0.031) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)
2      -0.023   
        (0.017)   
  Log(pay dispersion index)        -0.039 
  × (matches held in Dec.)        (0.068) 
  Right skewness    -0.023     
      (0.045)     
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  0.090  0.107  0.121  0.098 
    (0.144)  (0.154)  (0.142)  (0.143) 
  Years on the team  0.013  0.016  0.022  0.015 
    (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
  Years in first division  0.003  0.002  -0.001  0.002 
    (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
  Age  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.001 
    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Coach:  New to the team  -0.093*  -0.090*  -0.080  -0.090* 
    (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.050) 
  Replaced during the season  0.120**  0.120**  0.112**  0.118** 
    (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
  Years on the team  -0.035**  -0.034**  -0.030**  -0.034** 
    (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
  Years in first division  0.010*  0.009  0.010*  0.009* 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
  Age  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007  -0.007 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  Disqualified players  0.040*  0.041*  0.041*  0.041* 
    (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
  Home play  0.255***  0.253***  0.253***  0.254*** 
    (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.171***  -0.168***  -0.168***  -0.169*** 
    (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.071  0.029  0.030  0.030 
    (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  0.144  0.136  0.137  0.136 
    (0.105)  (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.106) 
  Years in the team  0.045**  0.044*  0.043*  0.044* 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
  Years in first division  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001 
    (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
  Age  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.004 
    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match 
  Log-likelihood  -371.072  -371.378  -370.997  -371.461 
  McFadden R
2  0.156  0.155  0.156  0.155 
  Count R
2  0.689  0.691  0.692  0.689 
Note: 666 observations on 40 teams (on average, 16.6 matches per team). The dependent variable is a dummy 
=1 in case of a win. The pay dispersion index is the Gini index in column (1), and the Theil index in columns (2), 
(3), and (4). Team-clustered standard errors are given in parentheses; p values in brackets. * p < 0.1; ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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B.3.  Individual Performance: Accounting for SIPA’s Authors 
Table B3 replicates the analysis in Table 6 of the main text, using as SIPAs those reported 
from the main sport newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport, rather than the average from three 
newspapers (La Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere dello Sport, and Tutto Sport). In this case we 
have 381 more observations, because journalists for La Gazzetta dello Sport also assigned 
SIPAs to athletes who played for just few minutes; they did so more frequently than did 
journalists in the other two newspapers. 
To  control  for  the  subjectivity  in  this  measure,  the  regression  includes  34  dummy 
variables, each one indicating the journalist who made the SIPA. In most—but not all—cases 
we find no journalist effect. Figure B2 plots the SIPA predicted from column (2) of Table B3. 
This is the counterpart to Figure 4 in the main text. 
 
FIGURE B2. Predicted SIPA, by pay dispersion 
  
Note: Predictions are based on the average explanatory variables and the parameter estimates from Table B3,  
column (2). 
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TABLE B3. Individual performance: journalist effect (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  Pooled OLS  RE GLS  FE OLS 
Player:  Pay/average pay  0.105***  0.108***  -0.146 
    (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.183) 
  New to the team  0.009  0.008   
    (0.027)  (0.023)   
  Years on the team  0.012**  0.013***   
    (0.005)  (0.004)   
  Years in first division  -0.003  -0.003   
    (0.004)  (0.004)   
  Age  0.000  0.000   
    (0.003)  (0.003)   
  Midfield role  0.045**  0.048**   
    (0.020)  (0.019)   
  Forward role  -0.028  -0.027   
    (0.028)  (0.025)   
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.076***  0.079***  -0.146 
    (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.208) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.050***  -0.062***  -0.140*** 
    (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  0.107  0.075  -0.089 
    (0.083)  (0.078)  (0.127) 
  Years on the team  0.003  -0.005  -0.040 
    (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
  Years in first division  0.006  0.008  0.007 
    (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.020) 
  Age  -0.003  -0.000  0.007 
    (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.017) 
Coach:  New to the team  -0.024  -0.018  0.022 
    (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.108) 
  Replaced during the season  -0.026  -0.009  0.153** 
    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.065) 
  Years on the team  -0.011  -0.011  0.047 
    (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.036) 
  Years in first division  0.007**  0.007**  -0.007 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
  Age  0.001  0.001  0.005 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.011**  -0.010**  -0.004 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
  Disqualified players  0.034***  0.039***  0.057*** 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
  Home play  0.152***  0.152***  0.149*** 
    (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.033*  -0.034**  -0.041** 
    (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.061***  0.060***  0.062*** 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  -0.038  -0.023  0.075 
    (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.069) 
  Years on the team  0.007  0.008  0.018 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
  Years in first division  -0.001  0.001  0.007 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
  Age  0.009  0.008  0.002 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
  Constant  5.243***  5.130***  6.649*** 
    (0.361)  (0.323)  (1.609) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match and dummy variables on the journalist giving the SIPAs 
  R
2  0.047  0.046  0.000 
  Rho coefficient    0.039  0.307 
  Test pooled vs. panel    223.700  1.840 
      [0.000]  [0.000] 
Note: 8,609 observations on 891 players (on average, 9.66 matches per player). The dependent variable is the 
SIPA from La Gazzetta dello Sport. Standard errors are given in parentheses; p values in brackets. In column 1 
(pooled OLS) we report player-clustered standard errors. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 46 
B.4.  Individual Performance: Regular and Superstar Players 
We replicate the analysis shown in Table 6, including in the specification further variables on 
the player. Specifically, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the player earns at least 
twice the average pay in the team roster (“superstar”) and another dummy variable equal to 1 
if  the  player  is  one  of  the  11  team  members  who  played  most  of  the  first  five  matches 
(“regular”). The output of this analysis, based on pooled OLS and random-effect (RE) panel 
GLS regressions, is shown respectively in columns (1) and (2) of Table B4. We then also add 
the interactions between the two dummy variables and the pay dispersion index. The purpose 
is to understand whether the effect of pay dispersion on individual performance persists after 
accounting for individual skills, and whether its effect is different among top players. In this 
case the output is shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table B4, respectively using pooled OLS 
and random-effect panel GLS regressions. 
 
TABLE B4. Individual performance: specification (average marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Method:  Pooled OLS  RE GLS  Pooled OLS  RE GLS 
Player:  Pay/average pay  0.065**  0.064**  0.075***  0.075*** 
    (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
  New to the team  0.009  0.009  0.007  0.007 
    (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
  Years on the team  0.013***  0.014***  0.013***  0.014*** 
    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
  Years in first division  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
    (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
  Age  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  Midfield role  0.058***  0.060***  0.058***  0.060*** 
    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
  Forward role  0.010  0.011  0.008  0.009 
    (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
  Regular  0.088***  0.090***  0.165**  0.143** 
    (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.067)  (0.062) 
  Superstar  0.040  0.051  -0.176  -0.216* 
    (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.132)  (0.125) 
Pay:  Log(average pay)  0.080***  0.078***  0.078***  0.076*** 
    (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  -0.065***  -0.078***  -0.080***  -0.085*** 
    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)      0.033  0.023 
  × regular      (0.027)  (0.025) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)      -0.096*  -0.120** 
  × superstar      (0.055)  (0.053) 
Team:  Fraction of new players on the team  0.054  0.029  0.063  0.037 
    (0.073)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.070) 
  Years on the team  -0.004  -0.009  -0.003  -0.008 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
  Years in first division  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  Age  -0.008  -0.003  -0.007  -0.002 
    (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
(continues on the next page) 
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Coach:  New to the team  -0.006  0.003  -0.003  0.006 
    (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.026) 
  Replaced during the season  -0.016  0.009  -0.020  0.004 
    (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
  Years on the team  -0.009  -0.008  -0.010  -0.009 
    (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
  Years in first division  0.007**  0.007**  0.007**  0.007** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  Age  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Match:  Injured players  -0.008*  -0.005  -0.009*  -0.006 
    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
  Disqualified players  0.051***  0.058***  0.051***  0.057*** 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
  Home play  0.143***  0.143***  0.143***  0.143*** 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Opponent:  Log(average pay)  -0.043***  -0.044***  -0.043***  -0.044*** 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
  Log(pay dispersion index)  0.054***  0.053***  0.054***  0.053*** 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
  Fraction of new players on the team  0.040  0.060  0.038  0.057 
    (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.057) 
  Years on the team  -0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.002 
    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  Years in first division  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.005 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Age  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.007 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Constant  5.365***  5.189***  5.304***  5.149*** 
    (0.305)  (0.272)  (0.310)  (0.276) 
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match 
  R
2  0.045  0.044  0.045  0.045 
  Rho coefficient    0.051    0.051 
  Test pooled vs. panel    256.120    253.810 
      [0.000]    [0.000] 
Note: 8,226 observations on 876 players (on average, 9.39 matches per player). The dependent variable is the 
SIPA from the three newspapers. Standard errors are given in parentheses; p values in brackets. In columns 1 
and 3 we report player-clustered standard errors. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
Our benchmark results of Section 3.3 are confirmed; in addition, we find a positive effect 
on individual performance of being a regular player (who receives on average a SIPA that is 
0.09 points higher than a non-regular player) and a larger negative effect of pay dispersion 
among superstars: doubling pay dispersion gives rise to a SIPA reduction of 0.09 points for a 
generic player, and 0.20 points for a superstar. 
We repeated this analysis using alternative definitions of regular players, based on those 
who  played  most  of  the  first  9  or  17  matches.  The  results  are  qualitatively  confirmed, 
essentially because in most cases we identify the same players as regular (of those who played 
most of the first 5 matches, 89.09% also played most of the first 9 matches and 82.27% also 
played most of the first 17 matches). Marginal effects are, however, quantitatively larger than 
what we find with the definition discussed here. 